From 00ba735b875be08adbf1bb388cbce8155a1ed978 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Todd Short Date: Tue, 7 Sep 2021 12:26:10 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 37/43] QUIC: Update RFC references --- doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_quic_method.pod | 11 +++++------ include/openssl/tls1.h | 2 +- ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 2 +- ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c | 2 +- ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_quic_method.pod +++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_quic_method.pod @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSL_quic_max_handshake_flight_len() retu that may be received at the given encryption level. This function should be used to limit buffering in the QUIC implementation. -See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-27#section-4. +See L. SSL_quic_read_level() returns the current read encryption level. @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ These APIs are implementations of Boring QUIC acts as an underlying transport for the TLS 1.3 handshake. The following functions allow a QUIC implementation to serve as the underlying transport as -described in draft-ietf-quic-tls. +described in RFC9001. When configured for QUIC, SSL_do_handshake() will drive the handshake as before, but it will not use the configured B. It will call functions from @@ -139,18 +139,17 @@ pass the active write level to add_hands can use SSL_quic_write_level() to query the active write level when generating their own errors. -See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls-27#section-4.1 for more -details. +See L for more details. To avoid DoS attacks, the QUIC implementation must limit the amount of data being queued up. The implementation can call SSL_quic_max_handshake_flight_len() to get the maximum buffer length at each encryption level. -draft-ietf-quic-tls defines a new TLS extension "quic_transport_parameters" +RFC9001 defines a new TLS extension "quic_transport_parameters" used by QUIC for each endpoint to unilaterally declare its supported transport parameters. The contents of the extension are specified in -https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-27#section-18 (as +L (as a sequence of tag/length/value parameters) along with the interpretation of the various parameters and the rules for their processing. --- a/include/openssl/tls1.h +++ b/include/openssl/tls1.h @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ extern "C" { /* Temporary extension type */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01 -/* ExtensionType value from draft-ietf-quic-tls-27 */ + /* ExtensionType value from RFC9001 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters_draft 0xffa5 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters 0x0039 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c @@ -1967,7 +1967,7 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PA #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC /* * QUIC server must send 0xFFFFFFFF or it's a PROTOCOL_VIOLATION - * per draft-ietf-quic-tls-27 S4.5 + * per RFC9001 S4.6.1 */ if (s->quic_method != NULL && max_early_data != 0xFFFFFFFF) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c @@ -1929,7 +1929,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC - /* QUIC server must always send 0xFFFFFFFF, per draft-ietf-quic-tls-27 S4.5 */ + /* QUIC server must always send 0xFFFFFFFF, per RFC9001 S4.6.1 */ if (SSL_IS_QUIC(s)) max_early_data = 0xFFFFFFFF; #endif --- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ int ossl_statem_client_construct_message case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC - /* QUIC does not send EndOfEarlyData, draft-ietf-quic-tls-24 S8.3 */ + /* QUIC does not send EndOfEarlyData, RFC9001 S8.3 */ if (s->quic_method != NULL) { *confunc = NULL; *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;